Poverty in Middle Income Countries by Andy Sumner
Poverty in Middle-Income Countries
What’s changed?
In 1990, 93 per cent of the world’s poor people 
lived in low-income countries (LICs). Now, more 
than 70 per cent – up to a billion of the world’s 
poorest people or a ‘new bottom billion’ – live in 
middle-income countries (MICs) (and most of 
them in stable, non-fragile middle-income 
countries) (see Table). Furthermore, and contrary 
to earlier estimates that a third of the world’s poor 
live in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), 
based on data from the early 2000s, a ‘ball-park’ 
estimate (taking the broad definition of 43 
countries from combining the Fragile States lists), 
is that in 2007 about 23 per cent of the poor lived 
in FCAS and these were split fairly evenly 
between fragile LICs and fragile MICs.
Why?
Many of the world’s poor people live in countries 
that have got richer in average per capita terms 
and have been subsequently been reclassified as 
MICs. After rising considerably in the 1990s, the 
total number of LICs has fallen significantly since 
FY2000. According to the Atlas GNI per capita 
data and country classifications (for World Bank 
FY2011), over the last decade the number of 
LICs fell from 63 to just 35 countries in FY2011. 
Most of the world’s poor people live in countries 
that have moved from low- to middle-income 
country status since 1999 when China graduated 
to MIC status – notably Pakistan (2008), India 
(2007), Nigeria (2008), and Indonesia (2003) 
(henceforth, with China, the PINCIs). China is 
now an Upper MIC as of July 2011. This con-
centration of the world’s poor people in relatively 
few countries is a key part of the story. Although 
28 countries have transitioned from LIC to MIC 
since 2000, about 60 per cent of the world’s poor 
now live in just five populous new MIC countries 
– the PINCIs noted above. Indeed, of the top ten 
countries by contribution to global poverty, only 
four are LICs – Bangladesh, DRC, Tanzania and 
Ethiopia. 
In sum, most of the world’s poor do not live in 
countries classified by the World Bank as LICs 
and most of the world’s poor do not live in FCAS.
So what?
The shift in the distribution of global poverty can 
be viewed in three possible ways. First, it could 
all be a sleight of hand – the world’s poor still live 
in ‘poor’ countries, albeit slightly less poor than 
before. Second, it is business as usual because 
there are limits to domestic taxation on the rich 
and expanding middle classes in developing 
countries. Or third, this shift could mean that a 
fundamental reframing of global poverty is 
required, ‘traditional aid’ (resource transfer) is no 
longer relevant and global poverty is now about 
equity/inclusion/exclusion, advocacy coalitions 
and is ‘beyond traditional aid’ questions such as 
global public goods.
If we accept that the third view will increasingly 
be the case in years ahead and if external 
development actors want to reduce global 
poverty, they will need to work in MICs but with 
new objectives and policies and partnerships (or 
alternatively, focus on LICs alone and the quarter 
of the world’s poor who live in LICs). Working in 
MICs will inevitably lead to more political tension 
– on spending priorities, political voice, policy 
coherence; this will mean that external 
development actors will need more political 
analysis.
The analysis of the data that world poverty is 
turning from an international to a national 
distribution problem, means that governance and 
domestic taxation and redistribution policies are 
becoming more important than ODA (and new 
MICs may not want development assistance of 
the traditional bilateral sort). Aid to low-income 
countries will still be about resource transfers and 
increasingly about fragility, conflict, and 
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countries. Middle-income countries 
are less and less likely to need or 
want resource transfers over time; 
instead, they will probably be 
more concerned with ‘policy 
coherence’ from traditional donors. 
MICs may be more concerned with 
designing favourable and coherent 
development policies on remittances 
and migration, trade preferences, and 
climate negotiations and financing, 
as well as tax havens. Further, it is 
unlikely that taxpayers in donor 
countries will be comfortable with 
resource transfers to countries that 
have substantial domestic resources.
At the same time, external 
development actors are likely to be 
increasingly concerned about equity 
and governance issues – and drivers 
of progressive change. It is true that 
many middle-income countries may 
be able to support their own poor 
people to a certain extent, but 
inequality remains an important 
issue. Poor people often lack a voice 
in governance structures, and their 
governments may lack political will, 
even when domestic resources are on 
the rise. In such cases, traditional 
donors might seek to direct their 
activities towards supporting 
inclusive policy processes and the 
media, social movements, advocacy 
groups and civil society organisations, 
and other drivers of change. Doing 
so may not be well received by MIC 
governments; many of them will be 
donors themselves and perhaps less 
interested in ‘progressive (domestic) 
change’ and more in their foreign and 
economic policy interests as noted 
above. The main area of agreement 
might be in global public goods, where 
interest in collective action on 
security, climate change, and other 
global issues is shared. The other 
issues could include defining global 
poverty as a global public ‘bad’ that 
requires collective action, although 
specific political and economic 
interests over who contributes and 
who benefits differ among countries.
What can external development 
actors do in the short term?
In the meantime continued donor 
relationships with MICs are justified 
on the grounds of: high levels of 
exclusion and inequality; domestic 
constraints (e.g. inadequate tax 
systems); need for technical 
expertise; and international and 
regional public goods. However, 
external development actors may 
lack financial leverage in MICs, so will 
need to find alternative means of 
supporting poverty reduction. This 
might involve engaging with civil 
society and NGOs. Such engagement 
is likely to be highly politically 
sensitive and donors will need to tread 
carefully, employing detailed 
understanding of political and 
economic conditions. External 
development actors will increasingly 
need to recognise that MICs have 
moved from being passive recipients 
of aid to being active participants in 
the international architecture. Indeed, 
many of the MICs may well be foreign 
aid donors themselves. The 
changing dynamic entails a need to 
rethink development assistance from 
a focus on poor countries to poor 
people and tailored to different types 
of context. 
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